Complex social systems require knowledge specialists who provide information that political actors rely on to solve policy challenges. Successful advice is unproblematic; more significant is assigning institutional blame in the aftermath of advice considered wrong or harmful, undercutting state security. How do experts, operating within epistemic communities, preserve their reputation in the face of charges of incompetence or malice? Attacks on experts and their sponsors can be an effective form of contentious politics, a wedge to denounce other institutional players. To examine the politics of expertise we analyze the debate in the early 1950s over “Who Lost China?,” the congressional attempt to assign responsibility for the fall of the Nationalist regime to the Communists. Using a “strong case,” we examine political battles over the motives of Professor Owen Lattimore. For epistemic authority an expert must be defined as qualified (having appropriate credentials), influential (providing consequential information), and innocent (demonstrating epistemic neutrality). We focus on two forms of attack: smears (an oppositional presentation of a set of linked claims) and degradation ceremonies (the institutional awarding of stigma). We differentiate these by the critic’s links to systems of power. Smears appear when reputational rivals lack power to make their claims stick, while degradation ceremonies operate through dominance within an institutional setting. Policy experts are awarded provisional credibility, but this access to an autonomous realm of knowledge can be countered by opponents with alternate sources of power. Ultimately expertise involves not only knowledge, but also the presentation of a validated self. Keywords: expertise; reputation; politics; China; Communism.

As we evaluate the failures in our invasion of Iraq, much blame has been placed on the advice of a group of men and women labeled neoconservatives. These policy experts have been targeted with misinterpreting information and providing advice that contributed to mistaken, even disastrous, American policy. But more than just being wrong in their expectations, some critics, such as Seymour Hersh (2005), suggest that these policy experts constituted a “cult,” and others allege that they were a group that placed the interests of the Bush administration, the Republican Party, or the state of Israel above that of the United States.

Such bitter and polemical charges can place experts at reputational risk at moments in which their advice is deemed erroneous. But on what basis do we evaluate experts? How do experts defend themselves? And how is expertise a form of self-presentation? Expert systems justify the modern state (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). As a result, attacks on that system targeting a vulnerable, accessible feature—the character of the expert—endanger political stability, potentially leading to withdrawal of support by the governed. As Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1990) emphasize, states develop strategies that control risk and/or find...
sources to blame should the system be challenged. Experts are not only guides, but they are access points whose presence preserves or undercuts state legitimacy. States and experts are linked within a network of authority.

Yet, when things go wrong, there is a desire to create distance between the state and the expert, often by both parties. Although sociologists have recognized the importance of experts, the process by which this undercutting of the network of authority occurs has been ignored. When a policy failure occurs, experts must defend themselves in a competitive knowledge environment in which outcomes may be linked to a set of hidden motives and state institutions must determine whether and how to allocate blame. The acceptance of expertise depends on the assumption that, while each expert has a perspective (Tetlock 2005), fair evaluation will trump personal desire. As a result, if claimants are believed to have the resources and background to know the truth, how can clients judge why things went wrong? Given the difficulty of assessing the policy claims themselves, the politics of expertise is linked to the personalization of policy. The reputation of the expert constitutes a commodity that is bolstered by sponsors and undercut by opponents. Experts who analyze political situations and provide advice for decision makers may face challenges as decisions are tied to the moral stature of their proponent (Fine 2006b; Snow 1979). These debates can become character contests (Athens 1980; Goffman 1967). Who can trump what, as claims from “good” people are given great weight and the ideas of “bad guys” are denigrated. Debate is likely to be fierce if the consequences are perceived to be significant and if the issue divides interest groups. Issues that involve “existential threat”—or deep challenges to the security of the state—such as national defense, foreign policy, or economic stability are prime examples, but scientific debates can be contentious if important resource allocations (Epstein 1996) or consequential policies are at stake (Hilgartner 2000), as in debates about global warming or the linkage of the MMR vaccine and autism.

Crucial to the evaluation of experts is the establishment and maintenance of their reputations. In political domains, policy is translated into personal attack (Fine 2006b). Reputation is a social good shaped by those with resources and with strategic interests. It is through reputation that status systems are organized (Lang and Lang 1990; Tuchman and Fortin 1989) and trust is established (Gamsetta 1993; Kollock 1994). Facing uncertainty (Henshel 1982; Rescher 1998; Tetlock 2005), audiences search for institutional bases of confidence, relying on those with the “authority to know” (Mukerji 1976). The solidification of reputation becomes part of the process by which communities develop confidence in institutional decision making. Judging a person is more efficient than evaluating specialized knowledge. When they maintain their reputations and avoid attacks, experts are knowledge brokers. As such, others who wish to shape outcomes become reputational entrepreneurs, focusing on the standing of the expert as much as on the content of the policy (Fine 2001).

Experts rarely stand alone, but are connected in knowledge networks. In this, experts do not represent themselves, but are treated (and treat themselves) as integral to a field of expertise (Bourdieu 1988) or an epistemic community (Haas 1992). Experts constitute a networked profession, as much as they constitute a body of knowledge. Being embedded in networks and institutional systems provides an opening through which outsiders can attack an expert, creating stigma by association (Adut 2004; Pontikes, Negro, and Rao 2010).

What—or who—is an “expert”? How do publics determine if aspirants for attention are honest brokers? As with the Mertonian image of the scientist (Merton 1968), the claim of disinterest stands at the heart of the conceptualization of the public intellectual, a figure who by virtue of credentials, knowledge claims, and social position asserts that his/her advice is generated through fair consideration (Fuller 2005; Kurzman and Owens 2002; Shils 1972). Yet, knowledge inevitably has a set of social relations and a politics.

The modern state demands a division of labor in which knowledge claims can be presented and vouched for (Habermas 1984). Although expert systems are often treated as disembodied in analyses of modernity, in practice differing views are asserted with great energy,
reflecting a diversity of opinion. As Philip Tetlock (2005) remarks pungently, “Every day, countless experts offer innumerable opinions in a dizzying array of forums. Cynics groan that expert communities seem ready at hand for virtually any issue in the political spotlight—communities from which governments or their critics can mobilize platoons of pundits to make prepackaged cases on a moment’s notice” (p. 1). Experts are more than just purveyors of opinion; they are a particular type of claimant, an embedded knowledge broker whose legitimacy is vouched for by a set of powerful elites. An expert is a sponsored intellectual, providing advice that institutions use to take or justify action (Eyal 2006; Hammelmann 1947; Rich 2004:210). Put another way, experts belong to epistemic communities that when fully developed have a status system, support networks, and connections to communities of power—and rivals.

Whether one treats expert communities as unitary or divided, state systems depend on what they claim is “objective” knowledge to justify policy. The modern state can only address social problems by means of specialists, often men and women formally outside the government apparatus but with linkages to policy determination. Through the politics of expertise the state apparatus can justify its power and control. Experts are the pipeline through which specialized information is made available to decision makers (Hilgartner 2000; Pielke 2007) and by which decision makers can distance themselves from errors. But in contentious domains it is precisely this alleged objectivity—and those who stand behind it—that can become the fulcrum for attack.

In theory, expertise should involve a balanced interpretation of the present, coupled with plausible assessments of the future. The advice of the expert should prevent unexpected shocks to the system, creating decisions of least regret. Often experts justify the beliefs that decision makers already hold (Martin 1973). As a result, rather than the expert shaping policy, they can be used after the fact to validate that policy, placing them at reputational risk in times of failure. When events transpire in ways that are disconcerting, political rivals search for answers—and for scapegoats. In the case of dramatic failures, it is often insufficient to assert that experts provided mistaken judgments, but their advice is transformed into moral discourse, the basis for attacks on character and motivation of the expert and on those who relied on her.

Within policy arenas, three features constitute reputation: qualifications, influence, and innocence. Each of these characteristics of the expert builds expertise, and each can undercut the expert. These criteria provide a sociological window into how expertise is judged: not through an appraisal of advice itself (often opaque to the evaluator), but through the stature of the expert. Each is judged by groups, often in contention with rivals. Our point is that expertise depends on the reputational judgment of a community.

A first challenge is whether experts have the qualifications that they claim and that are deemed necessary for justifying the advice that they proffer. Experts must possess credentials that establish their ability to present knowledge claims (Martin 1973:169). In contrast to other dimensions of expertise, consensus often emerges on appropriate background qualifications. Credentials have stable evaluative qualities unless opponents assert that the presentation of these qualifications is deceptive. While potential grounds for debate exist (is a graduate degree necessary, is “on the ground” experience essential, or is a written track record crucial?), the apparently obdurate character of credentials makes these fights secondary. The assessment of qualifications is the first stage in validating expertise.

When qualifications are granted, debate may occur over influence and innocence, rubbing off on those the experts advised. The credential of having been selected as an expert is itself a measure of influence and bolsters their advice. But beyond this, to be worth attacking experts must have impact in practice. For the expert to be consequential, the counsel must have been acted upon, and, thus, be influential. For a strong attack the claim is that a different decision would have occurred absent the advice. As a result, the expert does not stand alone, but operates within a social field, in league with those with greater power, the ultimate target of a discrediting charge.
Finally, the expert must be construed as *innocent*. The expert should support the client’s overarching goals, rather than support those of a hidden or external party. The attack depends on the claim that mistakes are not innocent, but follow from an agenda, typically one that is hidden, deceptive, or disingenuous. The expert is not an honest broker. This raises the question of whose interests are served by the expert’s recommendation. Asserting personal interest is not simply claiming that decisions are self-interested, but that they involve allegiance to a competing community, perhaps one to which the sponsors also hold allegiance. These claims do more than suggest the corruption of the expert, but question the transparency of the system of which the expert is a part. When value preferences are tied to disreputable groups, these associations can be discrediting. In other words, to preserve themselves experts must *perform* objectivity, not just present objective knowledge; expertise involves facework (Goffman 1967). The value-neutral ethic is a core claim of professionalism (Freidson 1984; Proctor 1991), but it must be demonstrated in action. Objectivity is a coveted virtue that must be protected against claims of hidden affiliation. In public contention, the problem of innocence extends beyond the self of the expert. Critics may allege that expert’s sponsors were aware of her lack of innocence, and that the bias of the expert reflects the bias of the sponsor. The politics of personification spreads stigma beyond the target.

In this article, we demonstrate how the insistent demand of contemporary states for expertise (a macro-argument, found in the writings of Giddens [1990], Beck [1992], and others) can be understood through the placement and resources of individuals and groups (a micro-argument that has been largely missing). The theoretical question that animates our analysis is how expertise as a characteristic of modernity comes to be defined in light of the moral character of the purveyors of knowledge. How is the character of the expert defended or attacked, supporting or undercutting fields of power?

The Politics of Denunciation

Just as experts can bolster governmental legitimacy, they also provide a point of attack. While the gathering of facts and advice for the modern state might seem a technical matter, in practice it justifies power. As we examine how reputations are built up, it is equally important to see the process through which they are torn down. While scholars have described the content of reputational attacks (Adut 2004; Alexander 2003; Boltanski 1999:57–76), the placement of denunciation as an embedded form of strategic action has been ignored. All denunciation is not the same, but differs in its relation to authority. We focus on two forms of attack distinguished by the relationship between the attacker and the control of forums of institutional power: the smear and the degradation ceremony.

While these two forms of denunciation have elements in common, they differ in crucial ways. The former is discursive; the latter structural. When opponents lack power to make their claims effectively, they attempt to *smear* those they oppose by broadcasting a set of linked and pejorative claims that tie the policy failure to moral deficiencies of the expert and her backers. The proponents have access to publicity, but not the power to create an official stigma. This attack produces indignation on the part of those aggrieved, but as Luc Boltanski (1999:65) emphasizes this indignation and denunciation constitutes an argument against the status quo that refuses to take formal action. This form of denunciation is triggered as a means of challenging the dominance of opponents. In contrast, when invested with authority, opponents can utilize denunciation as a basis of a *degradation ceremony*, formally assigning stigma to targets by virtue of institutional control.  

1. In the case over China policy that we describe, the degradation ceremony involved competition between two institutional centers (the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch).
Despite the emotionally charged labels, neither strategy is inherently unjust. In both instances, critics proffer evidence, and both place the target in a position in which an effective defense is difficult. The smear reflects the widely held belief that “where there’s smoke, there’s fire,” but it depends on an external audience to judge a set of rhetorical claims. Attackers present multiple charges simultaneously, each with a plausible provenance, at least to those who are primed to believe (Jonas 1957). A major strategy of smearing is repetition (“the big lie”), adding layers of inference and pejorative interpretations (Stapel and Spears 1996; Adut 2005). The degradation ceremony is an institutional ritual in which a discrediting identity is officially bestowed (Antonio 1972; Cossu 2009; Garfinkel 1956; Merelman 1969). As Harold Garfinkel put it (1956:421), the degradation ceremony is an organizational response to moral indignation, relying on a public rite of denunciation (Klapp 1964). But it is not organizations per se that respond, but groups using organizations to bolster their position of authority. Smears do not depend upon institutional ratification, but for degradation ceremonies these ratifications are essential.

The immediate challenge for expert reputation is that on some occasions consensus exists that policy outcomes were undesirable and followed from expert advice. As a result, experts and their community attempt to deflect blame, emphasizing that the advice was not fully implemented, downplaying influence, or asserting unpredictable contingencies, decoupling the advice from the outcome. In denying their responsibility experts must maintain their autonomy and future relevance. Ultimately to preserve legitimacy, the expert must mobilize support while providing an alternative account, relying on justifications and excuses (Scott and Lyman 1968). The former admits responsibility for the consequences but denies its pejorative quality; the latter admits that the consequences are negative, but denies full responsibility. Where consensus exists on the harmful or undesirable consequences of events, excuses are particularly prevalent.

Who Lost China?

To understand the performance of reputational challenges, we select a strong case: a crucial historical moment in which expertise is challenged. No example is typical, but by selecting a particularly vivid instance we see processes that occur in less extraordinary cases. In a strong case concepts are starkly illuminated, even if this illumination is not so dramatically presented elsewhere. As Howard Becker and Charles Ragin (1992) emphasize, it is the clarity of the case that builds theory. Such cases are not only dramatic but revelatory, exposing a social process that had not previously been examined (Yin 2008:47–50). The strong case becomes an ideal type from which process can be understood. To this end we reach back 60 years to a debate over American foreign policy and the motivations of experts in the years following the Communist takeover of China.² We examine reputational struggles over expertise by analyzing the combative debate in the early 1950s over “Who Lost China?,” focusing on the attacks by conservatives and countersubversives (Klehr and Radosh 1996; Schrecker 1998) on Johns Hopkins sinologist Owen Lattimore.³

The debate, as we present it, centered on a pair of “focal moments” (Alexander, Giesen, and Mast 2006): two highly publicized Senate committee hearings, and was one of the most

². The historical comparison with neo-conservatism is imperfect, even while suggestive. Neo-conservatives did not face the claims of subversion that China experts faced in the 1950s. However, both groups held diverse posts, inside and outside of government, both contained a mix of generalists and area specialists, and both were charged with slanting (or lying about) facts as they knew them. The current debate over the role of economists, inside and outside government, who favored market deregulation, also has something of this flavor.

³. Those on the left also attacked their opponents, linking them to Chiang Kai-shek, who was criticized as corrupt, ineffective, and authoritarian, or to Senator McCarthy. Their position was the dominant one in the academy (Walker 1998).
captivating dramas of what has become known as the “McCarthy era.” Through the symbolic resonance of the performances—in which individual advice was transformed into a broader claim of subversion—publics were forced to consider America’s global position and the possibility of Soviet political hegemony. While we briefly discuss the attitudes of the public towards the debate, given that our interest is how the politics of expertise is linked to challenges to government, we focus on these institutional forums with their different power bases. Following Barry Schwartz (2009), we recognize the “power of one;” an illustrative figure (in his case, Rosa Parks) provides cognitive focus by serving as the representative of a class of actors. Lattimore was not the only public figure who was attacked during this period, but through his institutional placement at the intersection of government, education, and public discourse, he was a symbolic villain.

By examining the case of Owen Lattimore in the “Who Lost China?” debate, we analyze how the politics of expertise depends on reputational battles. It is through battles over the influence and innocence of the expert that the state requirements for expertise are challenged through battles over individuals. The expert becomes an access point to criticize state authority. Reputational challenge is a form of a contentious politics in which the micro-level focus on the failures of particular experts challenges the intentions of state institutions that selected these actors.

Our analysis does not address whether Lattimore’s advice was prudent. This debate occurs as well—and it can be influential—but it is distinct from reputational politics. Policies often lead to unanticipated consequences (Boudon 1982; Coser 1969; Fine 2006a; Portes 2000), and not all mistakes are discrediting. However, sometimes opinion leaders treat mistakes as blameworthy failures especially when the locus of advice adheres to their opponents. In such circumstances politicians search for those responsible to determine the source of the error. Politicians read history backwards, searching for a blamable cause for present troubles. When defensive epistemic communities judge the blame as unfair, they define those attacked as scapegoats and the attacks as mudslinging (Klapp 1964:180) or character assassination (Davis 1950).

Data Sources

To analyze the controversy surrounding the attacks on China expert Owen Lattimore we rely on discussions of American politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and focus on two focal moments: a pair of Senate hearings that assessed Lattimore’s responsibility for the loss of China. The first was before the Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees (chaired by Senator Millard Tydings, Democrat from Maryland), commonly referred to as the Tydings Committee (1950); the second was before the Special Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws (chaired by Patrick McCarran, Democrat from Nevada), commonly referred to as McCarran committee (1951–1952). The voluminous congressional record details how Lattimore and his supporters presented him as an innocent and qualified expert and how his attackers discredited his narrative. As sites of performance, they demonstrate political semiosis, described by Robin Wagner-Pacifici (2010). Although a heated public debate occurred in newspaper and magazine articles, editorials, and letters to the editor about Lattimore’s character and advice, these hearings crystallized the debate in the public sphere.

In addition to the transcripts of the hearings, we draw on books and articles about the Lattimore case and related events, such as the debate over the role of the Institute of Pacific

4. One hears echoes today in claims asserting a linkage between America’s financial meltdown in 2008 and the rise of Chinese dominance on the global stage, and whether political actors (George Soros, the Federal Reserve) are responsible for the rupture.
Relations in China policy and the Amerasia case. Although only one full biography of Lattimore is available (Newman 1992), others wrote about the case, supporting and opposing Lattimore. Central are three books: Lattimore’s own defensive account *Ordeal by Slander* (1950), that of his major attacker, Freda Utley’s *The China Story* (1951), and that of prominent conservative intellectual, John Flynn’s *The Lattimore Story* (1953), also critical of Lattimore. Other books about the China Lobby (Keeley 1969; Koen 1960) reveal the reputation work of influential communities. Although not all of the books are polemics, we analyze the claims in light of the author’s perspective. We also gathered media reports to investigate responses from different political domains, focusing on articles in *The New York Times*, *The Baltimore Sun*, and *The Washington Post*, which generally supported Lattimore, and the more critical *Chicago Tribune* and *Time*, Henry Luce’s newsmagazine that first raised the question “Who Lost China?” (Herzstein 2005; Neils 1990). The press emphasized preferred themes as they translated Asian policy and allegations of conspiracy for the public. In effect, media outlets debated each other, as we see on cable television today. This is evident in editorials, but also in news reports, as in a comparison of *The Post* and the *Tribune*.

**Owen Lattimore: The Life of a Dominant Sinologist**

The early 1950s was a contentious moment in which committees of the U.S. Senate examined the perceived failure of American foreign policy under President Truman in “allowing” the Chinese Communist party under Mao Zedong to come to power on the mainland. Although much of the public recalls McCarthyism as a broad-brush attack on Communists, fellow travelers, and innocent victims, most of the charges of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) were aimed at the State Department and foreign policy experts (and later, fatally for McCarthy, against the U.S. Army). In the early years of his prominence, McCarthy and his senatorial allies, most notably Patrick McCarran, raised searching questions about which American officials and experts were responsible for the Communist takeover of China. As Walter Lippmann (1950) wrote, “The heart of the Republican attack is the belief, in itself quite legitimate, that after such a humiliating and costly disaster there must be an accounting” (p. 11). The fall of Nationalist China served for Americans as a moment of rupture, and one whose “restless” meaning needed to be solidified through acts of interpretation. The Lattimore hearings became a point in which complex historical contingencies became solidified into a narrative of blame (Wagner-Pacifici 2000, 2010).

Although several sinologists, including figures in the State Department and the academy, were targeted by conservatives, including John Stewart Service, Philip Jessup, and John King Fairbank (Evans 1988;Fairbank 1982), the most focused and venomous attack was aimed at Professor Owen Lattimore, the director of the Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University. Lattimore became a symbol of betrayal through his links to the Roosevelt administration, his academic prominence, his sympathy for the Chinese Communists, and his influence as editor of the journal *Pacific Affairs.* He was central to the nexus of liberals in the State Department, progressive academics, and sympathizers with the Chinese revolution. As such he was a plausible candidate for conservative outrage over liberal foreign policy. The focus of this article examines the general concern over debates on expertise, not to determine whether Lattimore was affiliated with the Communist party or knowingly supported the Communist “line.” However, the consensus view is that Lattimore was not a member of the

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5. John Stewart Service, a China expert who had worked in the State Department, had been forced out. John King Fairbank, a Harvard academic with similar views, had fewer government connections than Lattimore. While Jessup was targeted by McCarthy, he was less prominent than Lattimore. Although somewhat different in tone and location, the attacks on J. Robert Oppenheimer had some of the same flavor in their attempt to smear the scientist by questioning his innocence as filtered through claims of his loyalty (Thorpe 2006).
Communist party, was not involved in espionage, and did not deliberately promote Communist goals. The charge by McCarthy that Lattimore was a “top Soviet spy” was ludicrous, so much so that McCarthy soon backed off, and even sympathizers found the charge preposterous (Time 1950a). But some of Lattimore’s associates were Communists or had connections with Communists (Newman 1992) and some of Lattimore’s views were consistent with those of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists (Tsou 1975:222), such as his belief that the Russian role in the Chinese revolution was insignificant or his desire to distance American support from the Nationalist regime, post-war Japan, and Korea (Baltimore Sun 1950a, 1950b; New York Times 1950a:1; Time 1950b).

Owen Lattimore was born in Washington, DC in 1900. When one year old, he moved to China where his father taught English and French. First educated at home, Lattimore was later schooled in Switzerland and Britain. Having failed the Oxford scholarship exam, Lattimore never attended college. He returned to China and found employment at a British insurance firm, allowing him to travel. His years in business provided an opportunity to learn Chinese language, politics, and customs, knowledge rare for any Ph.D. in the early twentieth century. In retrospect, the most influential part of his travel was through Inner Asia where he gathered first-hand data for his canonical Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940). More importantly, he formed a deep affinity with local ethnic minorities, especially Mongolians, who were neglected by both Western public attention and scholarly studies. After his travels, Lattimore was supported by fellowships to write books about Inner Asia and China, cementing his reputation as an expert on Asian affairs (Rowe 2007).

The critical period in Lattimore’s career for his latter reputation was his service as editor of Pacific Affairs (1934–1941), the most prominent journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), a prestigious international research organization, although one later tarred with leftist affiliations (Hooper 1988). IPR started as a Hawaii-based research group and subsequently expanded into an international umbrella organization with branches in other countries, including the Soviet Union (Thomas 1974). These branches had a loose connection with the central council based in the United States, but these global members, including Socialists and Communists, participated in conferences and published articles in Pacific Affairs. Within the American council, Communists and fellow travelers were well-represented, including Frederick V. Field, the secretary of the council (1933–41), who later openly admitted his Communist affiliation. Lattimore published both pro-Communist articles and those critical of Communism, and added editorial comments to emphasize the journal’s putatively neutral stance. His alleged “soft” treatment of pro-Communist articles (Flynn 1953:37–38) caused trouble later when he was attacked by countersubversive conservatives.

In 1938, Lattimore was appointed lecturer and later the director of the Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University. However, he remained editor at the Institute of Pacific Relations. As a result Lattimore’s role involved being an independent researcher, ad hoc government employee, public intellectual, and university teacher. These conflicting roles provided opportunities for attack, as actions gaining status in one (e.g., public intellectual who writes controversial essays) could challenge others (e.g., government employee who must be diplomatic).

In 1941, President Roosevelt recommended Lattimore as an advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Chinese Nationalist government. During his mission in China, Lattimore worked closely with Chiang, who asked Roosevelt to extend his contract with the Chinese government for an additional year. While in Chungking (Chongqing), China’s war capital, Lattimore had extensive contact with Chinese from various backgrounds, including Communists, allies of the Nationalists in their coalition government. The following year Lattimore became director of the Pacific Bureau of the Office of War Information. Later he served as advisor to Vice President Henry Wallace on his three-month trip to China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union. Although Lattimore and Truman were not close, they did meet on one occasion.
Area Experts and the Loss of China

Sinologists, or China experts, in wartime and then in postwar America, served not only as academic researchers, but as expert voices to explain this exotic land to politicians and to the public (Fairbank 1982). As China became an important ally in the war against Japan, intense interest grew in East Asia. Two distinct and rivalrous groups dominated the discussion of China in the United States. The first were the “China Hands,” a group that included journalists, diplomats, and scholars who had resided in China, and were linked to the academy, the elite media, and the Department of State. The second were labeled the “China Lobby,” a pejorative term for a loose but relatively coherent group, including missionaries and importers (Koen 1960; Phillips 1950), tied to religious groups and business interests. While both groups admired China, they had different institutional positions. The China Hands were linked to leftist or liberal politicians, while the China Lobby was affiliated with conservative Republicans. The China Lobby, especially Henry Luce and his media empire (Herzstein 2005; Neils 1990), promoted Generalissimo Chiang and Madame Chiang in the 1930s and 1940s. The Chiangs were named “the couple of the year” by Time in 1937. This image of enlightened leaders contrasted with Chiang’s failure in the Chinese Civil War (1945–49).

Many Americans could not accept that the U.S.-supported Nationalist army, twice as large as its opponents, could be defeated by a group of “ragtag” Communists. The defeat must have had conspiratorial roots: Who lost China? Perhaps the question was absurd, but it was also serious. The proximate cause of the Nationalists’ defeat was the corruption of their regime and the lack of popular support (Pepper 1999). Yet, the question resonated as many Americans considered China part of the U.S. sphere of influence. Coupled with the spread of Communism in Eastern Europe, it appeared as though the United States had won the war, only to lose the peace. Such a dramatic reversal in Asia inspired a search for blame.

The China Hands provided a significantly different picture of Chiang and China than did the China Lobby. Many scholars were critical of Chiang and his Nationalist government and were more sanguine about a Communist victory, sometimes considering them agrarian reformers. John King Fairbank, a prominent China scholar, argued that the Chinese Communist Party was not a puppet of Moscow and noted the lack of support for the Nationalists from the peasants. This led to advice that continuing support for Chiang was unwise (Fairbank 1982:317–22). Only a handful of academic experts opposed this widely held opinion, cooperating with the China Lobby (Baltimore Sun 1952).

Because few Americans traveled to Asia, the perception of China and the evaluation of Chiang relied on the interpretations of those with local experience. Both groups presented “esoteric knowledge” (Fairbank 1982:317; Hung 2003). As a result, “the loss of China” debate involved reputational rivalry between two groups of specialists. The China Lobby, with their financial support, searched for villains, but the China Hands, some of whom influenced policy through their academic appointments or governmental involvement, emphasized their credentials and on-the-ground expertise (Lilley and Lilley 2004) and attacked the self-interest of the China Lobby. The two groups differed in their relationship to the politics-knowledge nexus that developed in the first half of the twentieth century. Members of “the China Lobby” were attacked by leftists and liberal media as partisan or as lobbyists paid by Chiang Kai-shek (Keeley 1969; Koen 1960; Thomas 1974). Lattimore, for instance, derided his opponents as a “bitter and implacable and fanatical group of people who will not tolerate any discussion of China which is not based upon absolute, total, and complete support of the Nationalist government” (Washington Post 1950a:21). In contrast, most of the China Hands were scholars, journalists, and diplomats (Kahn 1975; Lauren 1987; Pelcovits 1969; Rand 1995), criticized as linked to Socialists or Communists, shaping the foreign policy of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations (Utley 1951). The China Hands defended themselves by asserting disinterestedness or “objectivity” as justifying their professional standing, while opponents suggested that this claim of disinterest was a cover for recommendations that undercut American interests.
The debate pitted cultural authority against material advantage. It was as much about the standing of experts as about expertise.

The esoteric knowledge of experts has a dual effect on the field of expertise. On one hand, esoteric knowledge contributes to the autonomy of experts. Experts can be treated as professionals, workers with a body of knowledge not easily acquired by others. However, the opaque features of esoteric knowledge permits the claim that experts and those who rely upon them might have hidden motives. Unlike professionals, whose claim of disinterest seems plausible because their advice seems less directly tied to ideological desires, policy experts may be charged that their prescriptions are tied to political preferences. Trading in esoteric knowledge, experts are believed to have the capacity to deceive.

The Gathering Storm

The Red Scare of the late 1940s paved the way for McCarthyism and subsequent attacks on Owen Lattimore’s patriotism. By the late 1940s many believed that some Communists and their academic sympathizers were influencing American foreign policy. The predicate had been laid for claims of subversion. The perjury trial of Alger Hiss,6 the most sensational espionage case of the era, made Senator Joseph McCarthy’s accusation of Lattimore plausible, and a linkage between the two cases was frequently made (Chicago Tribune 1950a:20). Richard Nixon’s success in uncovering Hiss stimulated McCarthy to find a more prominent spy to gain public attention. Eventually McCarthy accused Lattimore of being Hiss’s “boss” (Newman 1992:214). The two men, in fact, knew each other and Lattimore had invited Hiss to stay at his home (Potter 1952). The Hiss case legitimated fear of Communism through which conservative politicians persuaded the public of the need to investigate Truman’s State Department.

Beginning with the Roosevelt presidency, Democrats had dominated American politics for nearly two decades, but they lost the 1946 midterm Congressional election. The power struggle between the parties became fiercer after Dewey’s stunning defeat by Truman in 1948. Republicans were hungry for an issue to attack Democrats and return to power. The loss of China and domestic Communist espionage served their ends.

The charges against Lattimore would not have existed without the sponsorship of Alfred Kohlberg, an importer of Chinese textiles and anti-Communist. Critics depicted Kohlberg as a businessman with limited fluency in Chinese and little knowledge of Chinese society (Newman 1992:125); friends asserted he had in-depth knowledge of China accumulated from his long-time business experience (Keeley 1969). But whether they agreed on his credentials, attackers and defenders recognized Kohlberg’s influence in the China Lobby. In 1943, Kohlberg, an active member of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China (ABMAC), visited China to investigate charges of corruption and misuse of medical aid. He became convinced that the staff of United China Relief (the parent group of ABMAC) was lying about the extent of corruption and felt that the charges of corruption “smelled like treason” and there must be Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations and United China Relief (Newman 1992:125; Thomas 1974:38–40). Kohlberg began reading the IPR’s journals Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey and discovered what he considered a conspiratorial linkage between IPR and the Communists. This started his decade-long attack on IPR and Owen Lattimore, then the editor of Pacific Affairs.

Kohlberg was not alone in his concerns (Chern 1976–1977). Max Eastman, a former Trotskyite, and J. B. Powell, a former journalist in China, collaborated on an article in Reader’s

6. Alger Hiss was a Department of State official, especially involved with the founding of the United Nations. In 1948, Whittaker Chambers, in testimony to the House Un-American Activities Committee, accused Hiss of being a Communist while in government service. Chambers subsequently provided evidence that indicted that Hiss had been involved in espionage for the Soviet Union. Because of statute of limitations had expired on charges of espionage, Hiss was tried and convicted on perjury charges in 1950.
that accused Lattimore and others with similar views of “practicing deceptions about China upon Americans” (Eastman and Powell 1945). These claims provided the basis of the subversion narrative expanded in the “Who Lost China?” debate. Differences in interpretation were real and consequential (Linebarger 1951:177). The assertions included that these experts falsely claimed that Chinese Communists were independent from Moscow; that Chinese Communists were fighting against Japan but nationalists were not; that the Nationalist government was fundamentally corrupt; and that Chiang was a fascist (Keeley 1969; Newman 1992:132).

With his supporters Kohlberg launched a personal crusade against subversion in America’s China policy. In 1945, in The China Monthly, a magazine supported by the China Lobby, he denounced Lattimore as “a great admirer of Soviet system” who praised the democracy of Soviet and Chinese Communists (Kohlberg 1945). Lattimore denied the main charges, while admitting that he mistakenly downplayed Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s influence on Chinese thought. Lattimore (1945) wrote, “the passage is one which I regularly bring to the attention of my university classes as an illustration of the fact that the student should not take any ‘expert’ for granted, but should constantly be aware that any expert may make serious mistakes” (p. 16). Lattimore distinguished innocent errors of interpretation from those that were deliberately misleading.

In addition to the China Lobby, a second group of reputational entrepreneurs had stakes in diminishing the reputations of “leftist” experts. These were ex-Communists, disillusioned with the Soviet Union. To the extent that these figures could “name names” they gained authority. In 1948, Alexander Barmine, a former Soviet brigadier general, accused Lattimore of being an agent working for the Soviets in 1933. His claim attracted attention from J. Edgar Hoover who ordered a thorough investigation. The FBI found no evidence of treason or espionage.

In the late 1940s, Louis Budenz, another prominent ex-Communist, began claiming that the American Communist Party and other leftist organizations were influencing American politics. Budenz (1947) recalled that Frederick V. Field, an American Communist Party leader, suggested working through “legitimate” organizations such as the IPR (Newman 1992: 194). The most influential ex-Communist in the attack on American foreign policy was Freda Utley, a prominent writer and journalist. Utley testified at both congressional hearings and published The China Story (1951) to refute Lattimore’s testimony and his book Ordeal by Slander (1950).

In 1949, Americans were stunned by the collapse of Chiang’s Nationalist regime and the State Department’s conclusion that the American government could not rescue the Nationalist government. The struggle between anti-Communist Republicans, the China Lobby, and conservative journalists and liberal Democrats, the Truman administration, and the academic community became fierce when Henry Luce’s Time raised the provocative question “Who Lost China?” in 1949. Time argued that the culprits in the loss of China included State Department employees, advisers, and diplomats. Suddenly the credentials, influence, and innocence of these figures mattered in the public debate. This set the stage for a pair of Senate hearings examining the alleged failings of the China Hands. Although individual reputations were at stake the battle was between policy groupings on the left and right with individuals, such as Lattimore, stand-ins for a broader political battle. While the debate was based in Washington, politically aware sectors of the public became involved, as witnessed by letters to the editor. The debate about Democratic failures in foreign affairs contributed to the Republican victories in the 1952 elections.

The Tydings Committee: The Politics of Smear

What is a smear? As noted, a smear is a pejorative label bolstered by a set of interlinked claims that in its totality has the effect of discrediting a reputation and which an influential discursive community believes to be wrong, unfair, or misleading. Smears are linked to relations
of power. We argue that smears are denunciations that lack the authority to be widely accepted. They may be well-publicized, but their influence is discursive, not coercive. If a smear is not quite a weapon of the weak (denouncers often have linkages to media), neither is it backed by organizational power. When smears are effective, they are perceived as sufficiently plausible by an audience to shape the reputation of a target (Jonas 1963). Sanction is embedded in changed knowledge regimes, rather than the more direct constraint of stigma.

Early attacks on Lattimore constituted what The Washington Post (1950b:10) described as the “promiscuous smearing of reputations,” charges that made Lattimore controversial and placed his reputation in play. Although members of the China Lobby had long targeted Lattimore, it was not until Senator McCarthy took up the cause that the attack on the China Hands became widely known. In March 1950, McCarthy, a first-term Republican backbencher, accused State Department officials of betraying America, specifically alleging that Owen Lattimore was “a top expert with tremendous power in the State Department which influenced American policy and led to the loss of China.” McCarthy addressed the Senate, “I believe you can ask almost any school child who the architect of our far eastern policy is, and he will say ‘Owen Lattimore’” (Newman 1992:222). Critics as well as defenders realized that Lattimore’s reputation was a wedge by which to debate America’s China policy. Lattimore’s supporters needed to protect their institutional legitimacy within Truman’s State Department, while opponents saw this as an opportunity to stigmatize an unpopular administration. The attack captured public attention and increased concern about subversion in government (Fairbank 1982:336; Newman 1992:213). By early June 1950, a Gallup Poll found that 82 percent of the American public had heard of McCarthy’s charges about Communist influence in the State Department, and of that group 45 percent of the public believed the charges with an additional 16 percent giving qualified approval. Only 31 percent rejected the charges. The charges had moved beyond the hearing room. But could the attack stick?

At the time of McCarthy’s accusation, Lattimore was on a United Nations mission to Afghanistan, and did not return until the mission was completed several weeks later. Upon arriving, Lattimore denied the accusations, hired attorneys, and prepared to defend himself before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by liberal Democratic Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland.

McCarthy and his supporters recognized that liberal Northeastern senators comprised a majority of the committee. Of the two Republicans, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts was not a McCarthy supporter. This segment of congressional leadership was predisposed to reject McCarthy’s charges. Only Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa was a staunch conservative. Such a committee would not endorse McCarthy’s claim. Although the outcome of the committee deliberation was evident from the outset, it provided a stage from which to present charges to external audiences—a smear that stuck to Lattimore although he was exonerated in the final report.

Both sides embraced Lattimore’s competence, rarely noting his absence of a college degree; each needed an expert Lattimore for their purposes. As R. L. Duffus (1950) wrote in The New York Times, reviewing Lattimore’s Ordeal by Slander, “His brief biography in Who’s Who reflects the most distinguished scholarship and connections . . . it is his integrity, not the soundness of his views, that was at stake” (p. 1). Senator McCarthy commented, when asked if Lattimore was a dupe of the Soviets, “I regard Lattimore as too brilliant to be used by anyone” (Dales 1950:1).

As a focus for political performance Lattimore mattered. But did Lattimore matter as a policy maker? Using their platform, McCarthy and his supporters constructed a narrative of misleading expertise. The sides differed in evaluating his influence. Building on the assertion of influence, antisubversives argued that Lattimore used his expertise to work for Communist causes (Buckley and Bozell 1954; Tsou 1975; Utley 1951). McCarthy, hoping to discredit the

7. The other two Democrats were Theodore Green of Rhode Island and Brien McMahon of Connecticut.
Truman administration, emphasized Lattimore’s role as the “architect of Far Eastern policy,” conspiring with Secretary of State Dean Acheson (a “Lattimore-Acheson axis”) to allow Asia to be “enslaved” by the Communists (New York Times 1950c:14). McCarthy argued, “the administration’s disastrous Far Eastern policy reflects, point by point, his recommendations and advice” (Edwards 1950:7). These views were echoed by the conservative Chicago Tribune (1950b:18), which editorialized about Lattimore’s “very considerable influence on the formation of state department policy governing the orient and, in particular, China.” The counter-subversives needed an influential Lattimore as a point of attack.

In contrast, both Lattimore and Acheson denied influence. Lattimore testified that he was “the least consulted man of all those who have a public reputation in this country as specialists on the Far East” (Friendly 1950:M1) and that “far from being the ‘architect of Far Eastern Policy,’ I have in fact no influence on the drafting of American Far Eastern Policy” (Lattimore 1950:25). Later he asserted that his own proposals came from “a general school of thought to which I was a minor adherent and not a shaper of that thought” (Marder 1952a:6). Acheson denied ever having met Lattimore (Andrews 1950: M1). Joseph Alsop (1951) suggested implausibly that, “Those who actually participated in the long struggle over American policy in China remember Lattimore chiefly as a rather languid, inconsequential man who turned up in Chungking for a few months as a paid adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and then drifted away again because he had no very significant advice to offer” (p. 13). To the extent that Lattimore could be isolated, the reputation of his colleagues could be preserved. Still, Lattimore was asked by the State Department for his counsel, had a desk at the White House for a time, traveled with Vice President Wallace throughout Asia, and had friendly relations with government diplomats. Lattimore’s attackers magnified his influence, suggesting that his advice was consequential, while his defenders deflated his role.

Beyond influence, the key focus of the smear was that Lattimore was not innocent, but was part of a network with an agenda, inimical to the interests of the United States. McCarthy charged that Lattimore was linked to Amerasia, a liberal-left journal, focusing on American-Asian policy, declared un-American by the Attorney General (Klehr and Radosh 1996) and that Lattimore’s affinity for the Soviet Union caused America incalculable and irreparable harm (U.S. Congress 1950:96). The ex-Communist Freda Utley dramatized the harm his advice caused:

Mr. Lattimore is such a renowned scholar, such an excellent writer, so adept at teaching the American people that they ought to stop opposing the great, good, and progressive Soviet Government that it is impossible to believe that Moscow would regard him as expendable, as all spies are (U.S. Congress 1950:768).

Using characteristically vivid language, Utley described Lattimore as a “siren luring us to the totalitarian abyss with sweet songs about the progressive, just, and democratic society which he says exists in the Soviet Union” (U.S. Congress 1950:768). She memorably described Lattimore as a “Judas cow,” leading other animals to slaughter (New York Times 1950a). Louis Budenz, a former editor of Daily Worker, the organ of the American Communist Party, suggested that Lattimore was a “public opinion agent,” following commands from party leaders to publish Communist writers in his journal (U.S. Congress 1950:499).

The claims undercutting Lattimore’s innocence were a collective product of the China Lobby, conservative politicians, and ex-Communist witnesses (Flynn 1953; Keeley 1969; Koen 1960) who wished to use his reputation as a wedge to denigrate the foreign policy establishment. He was pictured as deceptive, using his expertise and influence to manipulate naïve politicians about Chinese policy, painting Communists as agrarian reformers. In this classic smear, detail built on detail to paint a picture of a man who worked to achieve hidden ends.

Lattimore defended himself as qualified and innocent. He began his public statement by describing his career as a Far Eastern expert (U.S. Congress1950:419)—justifying the expertise that neither side doubted. Further, he defended his network. To learn about Chinese politics,
Lattimore asserted that an expert must communicate with “informed people all over the world, without regard to whether they were Communists, anti-Communists, politicians or scholars” (U.S. Congress 1950:436). He claimed that his Communist ties were essential for his expertise. His ties didn’t undercut his innocence, but constituted it. Social relations did not imply political affiliation as an expert’s research could be independent of political opinion. Lattimore argued for an autonomous knowledge community based in the academy and the State Department, linking his reputation to “the independent research worker who goes abroad to gather and study facts, as well as the men and women in the State Department who analyze situations and make policy recommendations, [who] must be free to discuss facts, and to present differing opinions, without baseless accusations of disloyalty if their facts or opinions are not pleasing to pressure groups” (Lattimore 1950:180). Lattimore argued for a hegemony of facts within a professional network in which stigma did not rub off from contact with disreputable others. He prided himself as being criticized by “Chinese, Japanese, Germans, Russians, and Mongols, as well as by intemperate American writers” (U.S. Congress Hearings 1950:437), suggesting that the breadth of these attacks revealed his autonomy and fairness.

Ultimately, Lattimore offered a defense that emphasized the value of independent research and the virtue of balanced assessments. In other words, he argued that he lacked perspectival interest and criticized McCarthy’s deliberate blurring of the distinction between an expert and a propagandist, asking:

How often does a man have to prove his loyalty as an American, not by the constructive work that he does, but by the angry denunciation in which he engages? How often does a loyal American have to prove his loyalty by the number of attacks on him, in the Soviet or American Communist press (U.S. Congress 1950:880–81)?

Intemperately, Lattimore sarcastically attacked Senator McCarthy and opposing witnesses for their ignorance of Far Eastern affairs (Fairbank 1982:335), attempting to undercut the credibility of the smear through attacking its proponents, playing into the personification of policy (Washington Post 1950c). At one point he asserted that the “Soviet Union ought to decorate McCarthy for telling the kind of lies about the United States that Russian propagandists couldn’t invent” (Owens 1950:1). Lattimore and his supporters transposed the smear by virtue of the committee’s support. It was McCarthy’s character that was at issue, not Lattimore’s, and he challenged the Wisconsin senator both on expertise and on innocence. Lattimore retorted, “I wonder a bit how a man so young as Joseph McCarthy, whose acquaintance with national and international affairs is so recent, can be a great expert on the difficult and complex problem of China and the Far East” (U.S. Congress 1950:419). When pointing to a letter of endorsement signed by 170 East Asia scholars (Lewis 1993), he denigrated McCarthy and Budenz: “It would be insulting even to compare the quality of their [the 170 scholars] judgment with that of McCarthy or Budenz, who are brazenly illiterate in the field where they presume to judge” (U.S. Congress 1950:825). Lattimore’s mockery gratified his supporters on the committee and in the public, but in the process he besmirched his own innocence, casting himself as partisan and gaining a set of devoted enemies. Through his strategy he undercut his own innocence.

In the end, the committee’s majority report found that the evidence from the testimony and FBI files did not support the charges against Lattimore, although both Republicans refused to sign the document. The committee’s majority wrote scathingly that McCarthy’s charge alleging Communists in the State Department were “a fraud and a hoax perpetrated on the Senate of the United States and the American people. They represent perhaps the most nefarious campaign of half-truths and untruth in the history of this Republic” (Newman 1992:300). The report received wide publicity, but in institutional terms it was McCarthy who was attacked. The Tydings committee with its majority of liberal members was not a suitable site for formal labeling. However, although the committee absolved Lattimore and assailed McCarthy, the hearings provided a venue for the smear to be publicized and to lay down roots.
McCarthy’s conspiracy narrative hit the front pages of newspapers and comforted audiences that believed that the loss of China was deliberate. An account of conspiracy with a wicked expert, unfaithful government officials, and naive public was persuasive to many, but waited for a change in the composition of the institutional arena to award stigma.

The McCarran Committee: Politics As Degradation Ceremony

Breaking out immediately after the Tydings hearings, the Korean War changed the discursive arena in which conservatives denounced betrayal. The Chinese Communists openly tilted towards the Soviet Union and fought with North Korea against the U.S. army. No longer could one assert that Mao was an agrarian reformer. Those who had suggested such were suspected for what they surely must have known. Tolerance towards Communism was not permitted in a time of war.

Prior to the 1952 elections in which Republicans took control of the Senate, Patrick McCarran of Nevada emerged as the leader of the antisubversives (Ybarra 2004). Although a Democrat, he long disliked the liberal wing of his party. Because of seniority, he became chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. McCarran believed in the existence of an influential Communist conspiracy centered in the State Department and in universities (Newman 1992:315). When McCarthy accused Lattimore in 1950, McCarran felt that he had found the leader of the intrigue.

After the Tydings hearings condemned McCarthy and exonerated Lattimore, McCarran chose to establish a more favorable venue for a degradation ceremony: the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. This setting was organized for the awarding of stigma. Each member, four Democrats and three Republicans, was conservative.8 The committee spoke with a single voice, a different voice than the Tydings hearings.

Whether the committee could be described as constituting a “reign of terror” as Lattimore claimed (Marder 1952b:1), it certainly was not a level playing field. Lattimore, attempting to delegitimize the committee’s innocence, alleged with some justice that the committee had its conclusions set, “Concerning my reputation and character, you have now for many months been publishing to the world an incredible mass of unsubstantiated accusations, allegations and insinuations. For months a long line of witnesses has set me in the midst of a murky atmosphere of pretended plots and conspiracies so that it is now practically impossible for my fellow citizens to follow in detail the specific refutation of each lie and smear” (Marder 1952b:4). In an editorial entitled “Ordeal by Exhaustion,” The Washington Post (1952:6) complained that the committee was structured to condemn Lattimore:

the McCarran Subcommittee has revealed a clear and deliberate pattern of procedure. It is not, in our judgment, a pattern designed to get at the truth; it is not a pattern which confirms to American standards of fair play; and it is not a pattern which reflects credit upon any congressional committee. . . . The subcommittee seems determined to beat Owen Lattimore into sheer physical exhaustion, to make fatigue and despair extort admissions which he would not make of his own free will. . . . It is a frightening spectacle, as one foreign journalist put it, to see a committee of the United States Senate bully and torment a witness in this fashion—as though he were in an arena, at bay, providing sport for the public.

The committee’s goal was not just to smear Lattimore. It was to make official the attacks and to affirm publicly the stigma of Lattimore and his State Department supporters. Along with J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, the staff and senators selected witnesses carefully and most were

8. In addition to McCarran, the three other Democrats (James Eastland [D-MS], Willis Smith [D-NC], and Herbert O’Conor [D-MD]) were conservative Democrats and vigorously anti-Communist. The three Republicans, Homer Ferguson [R-MI], William Jenner [R-IN], and Arthur Watkins [R-UT], were right-wing Republicans.
anti-Lattimore and anti-Communist. Staff rehearsed witnesses prior to testifying and carefully set the committee’s agenda (Newman 1992:324). Lattimore was questioned by the McCarran committee for 12 days. Lattimore, hostile from the first, was frequently interrupted and often could not finish his answers. The senators tried to provoke Lattimore and catch him in error, hoping that he would perjure himself (U.S. Congress 1952a:3394). Recognizing the danger, Lattimore focused on the dangers of expertise, and attempted to justify his advice, separating expertise from desirable outcomes. For Lattimore errors were not the grounds for institutional stigma. “If experts were infallible,” said Lattimore, “we would not have any; we would have a series of numbers on a telephone, and you would just dial and find out what is going to happen” (U.S. Congress 1952a:3032). However, the committee concluded that Lattimore’s errors were not “mere” errors of judgment, but reflected conspiracy. Lattimore’s attempt to escape blame argued for the assumption of his—and other experts’—disinterestedness:

Our observers must be allowed to report the facts as they see them, without the fear that their motives will be misconstrued if they tell the truth. We must know the facts favorable to our enemy as well as those that we like. Of equal importance, we must have the views and opinions of all who have any special competence. Their views must be freely stated and stoutly maintained, so that those who have the ultimate decisions to make may have the fullest choice of various alternatives and so that the people may understand the issues at stake (U.S. Congress 1952a:3120).

He applied a model of academic freedom to the political arena. Yet, antagonistic witnesses (Flynn 1953; Keeley 1969) questioned the self-claimed disinterestedness that they believed camouflaged a deliberate manipulation of public opinion. Stripping away claims of institutional autonomy, Utley (1951) suggested the expert’s assertion of disinterest need not reflect reality:

Lattimore is too clever to argue, or appear to be arguing, in favor of the Communist point of view. Instead he simply makes false assertions concerning Communism and the Soviet Union as if he were stating well-known and irrefutable facts. His smooth style, careful choice of innocuous words to describe Communist methods and aims, his pretense of not taking sides, his standing in the academic world, his erudition, and his historical distortions and omissions, all enable him to pile untruth upon half-truth upon untruth with an air of detachment and objectivity (p. 201).

Although his attackers’ suspicion of academic disinterestedness was certainly ideological, Lattimore’s claim of innocence and lack of influence was endangered by his role in foreign policy consulting and diplomacy. His high-profile position at the intersection of academia, policy making, and government bureaus made him vulnerable to the claim that he shaped American policy according to his interests.

Like the Tydings committee, the McCarran committee had made up its mind from the outset, but here the occasion was structured to tar Lattimore. Early in the hearings Senator McCarran declared, “Certain individuals, working together, influenced government policies out of which came the predicament we are in today” (Ybarra 2004:575). After Lattimore’s testimony, McCarran declared in public session:

The committee has been confronted here with an individual so flagrantly defiant of the United States Senate, so outspoken in his discourtesy, and so persistent in his efforts to confuse and obscure the facts, that the committee feels constrained to take due notice of his conduct . . . The shaping of United States policy with respect to China was a factor in the success of Communism in that land, in the establishment of firm roots for Soviet influence in all Asia and in the subsequent ordeal through which United States boys now are being taken in Korea, if this policy in its initial states, or at any time, was affected by acts or stratagems on the part of anyone having any slightest purpose except the welfare of this Nation, it would be a matter not to be lightly dealt with, nor one which the American people should easy overlook or forget (U.S. Congress 1952a:3674, 3679).

The committee concluded that “Owen Lattimore was, from some time beginning in the 1930s, a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy” (U.S. Congress 1952b:224). President
Truman recognized that the attack was ultimately aimed at him, and told his Attorney General that it was not Lattimore but the committee that should be indicted (Newman 1992:398). Based on the hearing Lattimore was charged with perjury about fairly minor statements of fact in his testimony, although eventually after three years the government dropped all charges.9

Whatever the justice of Lattimore’s assertion of his innocent expertise, it had little effect in a setting in which participants had concluded that he lacked innocence. The McCarran committee with its firm agenda was political theater, effective as a degradation ceremony, as described by Garfinkel (1956), similar to the hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Early in his testimony, Lattimore asserted that “I see no hope that this committee will fairly appraise the facts” (U.S. Congress 1952a:2926). That statement might have been true, but it invited the audience to take sides, and taking sides during the Korean War allowed the committee to stigmatize Lattimore. As a consequence, the McCarran Committee was effective in besmirching Owen Lattimore and Truman’s State Department (Ybarra 2004:598).10

The Rough Politics of Expertise

The case of Owen Lattimore provides an opening to understand epistemic authority in light of the institutional power of experts and their critics. We find that debates over advice can devolve into a personal politics, connecting identity with the content of decision making. During the twentieth century, being an expert has become a profession (Fligstein 2010; Tetlock 2005), not merely a skill, and, like all professions, depends on sponsorship deriving from embedded networks. A knowledge community provides both support and position within a social field. As a result, networks of affiliation potentially undercut innocence.

Sociologists have not adequately examined the personalization of policy, particularly as it arises as a form of reputational challenge to experts. How is expertise defined in light of the moral character of its proponent? It is here that a microsociology shapes state action. We need to build upon the macro-analysis of expertise as a building block of state power, suggested by Beck, Giddens, and Bourdieu. How does the expert use reputation to support her advice and the standing of institutional sponsors and how do opponents undercut that reputation? Ultimately expertise is a strategic resource within contentious politics. Micropolitics provides the basis for justifying the state’s use of knowledge. Analyzing the linkage between reputation work and state legitimation is our task.

For expertise to be credible its provider must be characterized by three criteria: qualifications, influence, and innocence. Together these legitimate the advice given and provide a bulwark against undesired outcomes. Each criterion determines whether the expert has the right to provide advice and whether she can be held accountable for failure. Legitimacy is a function of the knowledge provided as judged through the character of the provider. When all three apply, experts are awarded provisional autonomy.

Anyone can claim to be an expert, and many do so through writings and public appearances. The experts who reach public notice are those who have been sponsored by an institution: a university, a media outlet, corporation, or a government agency. But once sponsored, there are points of challenge by reputational entrepreneurs who wish to dismiss the ideas and denigrate the sponsors. The first point of attack is qualifications. Does the expert have

9. In 1953, Johns Hopkins shut down the Page School of International Relations that Lattimore directed and offered him the position of lecturer. In 1963, Lattimore emigrated from the United States to become professor at Leeds University in England.

10. The attacks Lattimore faced narrowed the boundaries of discourse and led academic sinologists to be cautious in praising “Communist China” and engendered public sympathy for Taiwan (Ho-fung Hung, personal communication, 2009).
the credentials deemed necessary for making empirical claims in a knowledge arena? While qualifications can be challenged, often consensus exists, particularly as in a heated battle such as that of Owen Lattimore where both sides wished for a credentialed expert.

Beyond this, for reputations to be worth challenging the target must matter. The inconsequential expert is not worth the effort. Facts are promiscuous, and many offer them. But the true expert must be in a position to have these facts embraced. She must have shaped the world, or at least government policy. Lattimore’s critics needed to demonstrate that his advice mattered, leading to the loss of China, through his linkages with the U.S. Department of State.

Finally there is innocence. Debates over innocence are essential in a modern world of expertise, linked to the establishment of trust as an access point in institutional systems (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990:83). The complexity of the world and prudent policy can only be known through the assumption of honest brokerage in epistemic communities. Such a model assumes common goals and values. Debates over expertise are a form of symbolic politics among rivalrous groups (Edelman 1968). As The New York Times put the matter: “how to distinguish between honest error and subversive intent on the part of responsible officials in analyzing the failure of national policy” (Phillips 1952:E3). The issue is not merely cognitive, it is social—a battle among groups with different institutional placements and sources of power. The evaluation of epistemic authority is linked to the reputations of knowledge carriers.

Experts in contentious arenas recognize the threats to their reputations. Similar to other professionals, experts wish to control their practices. Expert groups rhetorically claim Mertonian scientific virtues of disinterestedness and objectivity (Merton 1968). Fortunately those who judge expert claims typically operate from within the same epistemic community. In practice it is rare for such an intensive attempt to discredit an expert as occurred with Lattimore. Typically experts are posed against each other, allowing policy makers to choose. But at times the battle is joined.

Few experts are seen as mattering so greatly as did Lattimore, but then the fall of Chiang produced a threat to institutional stability and an opening for partisan rivalry. Owen Lattimore could be used to discredit his sponsors. If political actors perceive advantage as well as institutional threat, divisions between right and wrong—and between moral and immoral—may become sensational, and boundaries more tightly drawn with costs to those outside (Erikson 1966). Further, when powerful interests are offended (McCarran) or see advantage in attack (McCarthy), a political storm may gather. Lattimore did not make his position easier by refusing to update his identity in light of the “facts on the ground.” His performance of virtue was uncut by his willingness to denigrate opponents, strengthening their need for victory.

The forms of attacks on experts vary as a function of the institutional context and the interests and resources of rivals. In attacking while lacking secure institutional power, the goal is publicity. Foes must make claims through discourse that a target audience will find persuasive, despite a lack of institutional control. These claims (a “smear”) constitute a set of linked assertions that, when plausible, lead an audience to accept their evaluation.

Ultimately we argue that what allows denunciation to have consequence are the resources of its proponents, as much as the content. The politics of knowledge is tied to institutional position. If opponents can create a supportive environment, the attack’s effectiveness increases. Once critics gain power and conclude that an expert and the expert’s sponsors lack innocence, they may arrange a degradation ceremony with the “formal” awarding of stigma, a venue in which Congressional hearings excel, then and now. Political ritual cements reputation. As a result, the expert finds his or her reputation as a legitimate and honest broker stripped away. Rather than being merely controversial, the target becomes disreputable, and becomes unusable as an expert, at least while opposing forces have an institutional interest to preserve the established stigma.

More generally the evaluation of all experts, not just within the political realm, depends upon claims of competence bolstered by the consequence of their counsel and the neutrality of their advice. Experts simultaneously must guard their autonomy and guard their relevance.
to clients. Clients are often disappointed by the guidance of experts, but only occasionally are reputations smudged. Typically good faith is assumed. When we receive health care we desire that our physician be credentialed and not swayed by hidden cost-cutting rules and we are less forgiving of error if we mistrust our health care provider. In all fields of expertise, competence, consequence, and neutrality combine to provide a fair basis for decisions, even when the result veers from our hopes.

While we must explore expertise in light of its outcomes, testing when it serves as a good guide for action, the battle of experts may become a character contest within a competitive institutional domain. The reputation of experts justifies state policy and attacks on these experts constitute criticism of those institutions through which they have been sponsored. Debates about expertise are not merely technical matters, but constitute challenges to established authority.

While we have suggested the basic strategy through which this occurs, further research is necessary to determine the specific features of knowledge and knowledge holders that shape local tactics. Ultimately expertise as a social form is a result of who has the greatest resources—material and symbolic—and who has the greatest investment in proclaiming or attacking a reputation. Expertise is vital to modern institutions. But as long as expertise is intertwined with trust, expert actors are subject to challenge. Expertise involves the presentation of a professional self, guided by impression management, shaped both by the expert and by opposing reputational entrepreneurs. While experts struggle to construct their predictions, they also struggle to preserve their selves.

References


